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Abstract
Cloud storage is an emerging service model that enables individuals and en-
terprises to outsource the storage of data backups to remote cloud providers
at a low cost. This thesis presents methods to ensure the data security and
reliability of cloud backup systems.
In the first part of this thesis, we present FadeVersion, a secure cloud
backup system that serves as a security layer on top of todays cloud storage
services. FadeVersion follows the standard version-controlled backup design,
which eliminates the storage of redundant data across different versions of
backups. On top of this, FadeVersion applies cryptographic protection to data
backups. Specifically, it enables fine-grained assured deletion, that is, cloud
clients can assuredly delete particular backup versions or files on the cloud and
make them permanently inaccessible to anyone, while other versions that share
the common data of the deleted versions or files will remain unaffected. We
implement a proof-of-concept prototype of FadeVersion and conduct empirical
evaluation atop Amazon S3. We show that FadeVersion only adds minimal
performance overhead over a traditional cloud backup service that does not
support assured deletion.
In the second part of this thesis, we present CFTDedup, a distributed
proxy system designed for providing storage efficiency via deduplication in
cloud storage, while ensuring crash fault tolerance among proxies. It synchro-
nizes deduplication metadata among proxies to provide strong consistency.
It also batches metadata updates to mitigate synchronization overhead. We
i
implement a preliminary prototype of CFTDedup and evaluate via testbed
experiments its runtime performance in deduplication storage for virtual ma-
chine images. We also discuss several open issues on how to provide reliable,
high-performance deduplication storage. Our CFTDedup prototype provides












受影響。 我們實現了試驗性原型的 FadeVersion 並在亞馬遜S3之上進行實
證評價。 我們證明了，相對於不支援度安全刪除技術傳統的雲備份服務
FadeVersion 只增加小量額外開鎖。













1.1 Cloud Based Backup and Assured Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Crash Fault Tolerance for Backup Systems with Deduplication . 4
1.3 Outline of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Background and Related Work 7
2.1 Deduplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Assured Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Policy Based Assured Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Convergent Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5 Cloud Based Backup Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6 Fault Tolerant Deduplication Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Design of FadeVersion 12
3.1 Threat Model and Assumptions for Fade Version . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 Main Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4 Version Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.5 Assured Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.6 Assured Deletion for Multiple Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.7 Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
v
4 Implementation of FadeVersion 20
4.1 System Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2 Metadata Format in FadeVersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5 Evaluation of FadeVersion 24
5.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2 Backup/Restore Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3 Storage Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4 Monetary Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6 CFTDedup Design 31
6.1 Failure Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.2 System Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.3 Distributed Deduplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.4 Crash Fault Tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.5 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7 Evaluation of CFTDedup 37
7.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.2 Experiment 1 (Archival) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.3 Experiment 2 (Restore) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7.4 Experiment 3 (Recovery) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8 Future work and Conclusions of CFTDedup 43
8.1 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43






• Arthur Rahumed, and Patrick P. C. Lee, A Proxy-Based Deduplication
Storage System with Crash Fault Tolerance, Submitted to USENIX 8th
Workshop on Hot Topics in System Dependability
viii
List of Figures
3.1 Illustration of why existing version control systems and assured
deletion systems are incompatible. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Illustration of how version control works. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 Illustration of layered encryption, by extending the example
shown in Figure 3.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1 Architecture of FadeVersion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2 Metadata format for a single file: Cumulus (left) and FadeVer-
sion (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1 File size statistics for Day 1 and Day 46. . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2 Size of data changes reported by rdiff-backup per day. . . . . 25
5.3 Backup time for each incremental backup. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.4 Upload time for each incremental backup. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.5 Restore time for all 46 days of snapshots from local storage. . . 27
5.6 Size of incremental uploads for Cumulus and FadeVersion. . . . 29
6.1 CFTDedup architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1 Experiment 1 (Archival performance): (a) Cumulative space
usage with and without deduplication; (b) Upload time versus
segment size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
ix
7.2 Experiment 2 (Restore performance): (a) Download time versus
segment size; (b) Amount of downloaded data versus segment
size. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7.3 Experiment 3 (Recovery performance): (a) Recovery time when
a proxy fails; (b) Recovery time when the client fails. . . . . . . 42
x
List of Tables
5.1 Statistics of our dataset. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2 Summary of storage space on the cloud using Cumulus and
FadeVersion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.3 Storage costs per month and overall bandwidth cost of Cumu-
lus and FadeVersion for 46 days of backup with different cloud




Cloud computing is an emerging service model that provides computation and
storage resources on the Internet. One attractive functionality that cloud com-
puting can offer is cloud storage. Individuals and enterprises are often required
to remotely archive their data to avoid any information loss in case there are
any hardware/software failures or unforeseen disasters. Instead of purchasing
the needed storage media to keep data backups, individuals and enterprises
can simply outsource their data backup services to the cloud service providers,
which provide the necessary storage resources to host the data backups.
This thesis focuses on the problem of assured deletion and crash fault tol-
erance of cloud backup systems. We first propose a system called FadeVersion
to introduce assured deletion into cloud backup systems and then later ex-
plore adding crash fault tolerance by proposing another system CFTDedup.
However, due to time constraints, we were not able to add assured deletion to
CFTDedup.
1.1 Cloud Based Backup and Assured Dele-
tion
While cloud storage is attractive, how to provide security guarantees for out-
sourced data becomes a rising concern. One major security challenge is to
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provide the property of assured deletion, i.e., data files are permanently inac-
cessible upon requests of deletion.
Keeping data backups permanently is undesirable, as sensitive information
may be exposed in the future because of data breach or erroneous manage-
ment of cloud operators. Thus, to avoid liabilities, enterprises and government
agencies usually keep their backups for a finite number of years and request
to delete (or destroy) the backups afterwards. For example, the US Congress
is formulating the Internet Data Retention legislation in asking ISPs to retain
data for two years [1], while in United Kingdom, companies are required to
retain wages and salary records for six years [2].
Assured deletion aims to provide cloud clients an option of reliably destroy-
ing their data backups upon requests. On the other hand, cloud providers may
replicate multiple copies of data over the cloud infrastructure for fault-tolerance
reasons. Since cloud providers do not publicize their replication policies, cloud
clients do not know how many copies of their data are on the cloud, or where
these copies are located. It is unclear whether cloud providers can reliably
remove all replicated copies when cloud clients issue requests of deletion for
their outsourced data.
Therefore the design of a highly secure cloud backup system that enables
assured deletion for outsourced data backups on the cloud, while addressing
the important features for a typical backup application is desirable. One such
feature is to enable version control for outsourced data backups, so that cloud
clients can roll-back to extract data from earlier versions. Typically, each
backup version is incrementally built from the previous version. If the same
file appears in multiple versions, then it is natural to store only one copy of the
file and have the different versions refer to the file copy. However, there are
data dependencies across different versions, and deleting an old version may
make the future versions unrecoverable.
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In the first part of this thesis, we introduce FadeVersion a work in collab-
oration with Henry Chen Chuk Hin. FadeVersion secure cloud backup system
that supports both version control and assured deletion. FadeVersion allows
fine-grained assured deletion, such that cloud clients can specify particular
versions or files on the cloud to be assuredly deleted, while other versions that
share the common data of the deleted versions or files will remain unaffected.
The main idea of FadeVersion is to use a layered encryption approach. Suppose
that a file F appears in multiple versions. We first encrypt F with key k, and
then encrypt key k independently with different keys associated with different
versions. Thus, if we remove a key of one version, we can still recover key k
and hence file F in another version.
The result was a proof-of-concept prototype of FadeVersion that is com-
patible with today’s cloud storage services. We extend an open-source cloud
backup system Cumulus[3] and include the assured deletion feature. Using
Amazon S3 as the cloud storage backend, we empirically evaluated the perfor-
mance of FadeVersion. We also conducted economical cost analysis for Fade-
Version based on the cost plans of different cloud providers. We showed that
the additional overhead of FadeVersion is justifiable compared to a traditional
cloud backup service that does not possess the assured deletion functionality.
My main contribution to the project was modification of the Cumulus
backup program to support assured deletion, while my partner Henry Chen
was responsible modifying the Cumulus backup restore program to support for
the new backup format generated by FadeVersion.
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1.2 Crash Fault Tolerance for Backup Systems
with Deduplication
FadeVersion implements versioning via the technique of deduplication. Dedu-
plication [4] is a technique that has been widely used to achieve efficient storage.
It operates by splitting data into blocks and computing cryptographic hashes
on the content for each block. If two blocks have identical content, then they
have the same hash and hence only one physical copy of the block needs to be
stored.
From a client’s perspective, enabling deduplication in cloud storage can
be achieved via a proxy-based approach, in which a proxy (or gateway) serves
as an interface between different clients’ data sources and cloud storage sites.
The proxy applies deduplication to clients’ data before uploading the unique
data blocks to the cloud, and also keeps deduplication metadata to determine
if a data block can be deduplicated. Each client only needs to interface with
the proxy on how to upload/download data, without needing to implement the
deduplication logic. The proxy-based approach has been used and analyzed in
many cloud storage systems in business (e.g., [5, 6, 7, 8]) and academia (e.g.,
[9, 10, 11, 12]).
Deploying a single proxy is clearly prone to the performance bottleneck
and single-point-of-failure problems. If a proxy fails, the upload procedure
will have to be restarted from the beginning with another proxy, extending
the period where computer systems are taken oﬄine to complete the backup.
Furthermore, single proxy systems which perform deduplication will lose their
deduplication metadata which has to be recovered; otherwise the system will
lose the ability to deduplicate the data it is currently backing up with data
previously backed up.
Thus, we consider a distributed proxy system, in which multiple independent
proxies coordinate among themselves in the deduplication process. If a proxy
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crashes, clients can re-connect to the cloud via a different proxy, and it is
desirable that any subsequently uploaded data blocks can still be deduplicated
with the previously uploaded blocks before the crash so as to preserve storage
efficiency. On the other hand, maintaining consistent deduplication metadata
across multiple proxies is challenging. Our observation is that deduplication is
performed on a per-block basis, and hence updating deduplication metadata
on each data block across all proxies can introduce significant synchronization
overhead. This motivates us to explore the performance trade-off in designing
a fault-tolerant distributed proxy system for deduplication storage.
In the second part of this thesis, we propose CFTDedup, a distributed proxy
system designed for deduplication storage with crash fault tolerance (CFT).
Our current CFTDedup design considers one extreme of consistency known
as strong consistency, such that any updates to the deduplication metadata
are fully serialized, replicated, and synchronized across all proxies. All proxies
share the same view of the deduplication metadata. Any identical data blocks
that are uploaded through different proxies can still be deduplicated with one
another. In particular, we propose to aggregate data blocks into segments,
and batch the updates of deduplication metadata to mitigate synchronization
overhead.
We implement a preliminary prototype of CFTDedup, and evaluate via
testbed experiments its performance in storing virtual machine images. We
show that CFTDedup provides storage efficiency via deduplication, while en-
suring fault tolerance against proxy and client crashes. We believe that our
CFTDedup prototype provides a platform for future research. In view of this,
we conclude by discussing several open issues on how to provide reliable, high-
performance deduplication storage.
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1.3 Outline of Thesis
The remainder of the report proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 provides the nec-
essary background on deduplication, fault tolerance, and issues in integrating
assured deletion version control. Chapters 3, 4, 5, discusses the threat model,
design, implementation details of FadeVersion, and also the effectiveness and
performance overhead of FadeVersion respectively. Chapter 6 describes the
design and implementation of CFTDedup, and chapter 7 discusses the perfor-
mance of CFTDedup. Furthermore we discuss design tradeoffs in CFTDedup
and future work in chapter 8. Finally, we conclude the thesis in chapter 9.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, I will describe previous work related to FadeVersion and
CFTDedup.
2.1 Deduplication
Deduplication refers to the removal of duplicate data[13], which can be used
to reduce storage space and data transmission. It is performed by hashing
the data of interest, and then looking up a deduplication index to determine
if the data has been encountered before, if not, the system will update the
deduplication index to include the hash of the data. The deduplication index
can be implemented using a hash table in memory [14] or a database on the
hard drive[13]. One notable example of a deduplication system is DropBox[15],
a web based file hosting service[16].
2.2 Assured Deletion
There are different ways of achieving assured deletion. One approach is by
secure overwriting [17], in which new data is written over original data to make
the original data unrecoverable. Secure overwriting has also been applied in
versioning file systems [18]. However, this requires internal modifications of a
7
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file system and is not feasible for outsourced storage, since the storage backends
are maintained by third parties, and it has no guarantee that replicated data
will be over-written.
Another approach is achieved by cryptographic protection, which removes
the cryptographic keys that are used to decrypt data blocks to make the en-
crypted blocks unrecoverable [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. The encrypted data blocks
are stored in outsourced storage (e.g., clouds), while the cryptographic keys
are kept independently by a trusted entity also known as a key escrow system.
Conversely, to retrieve the data, the users can ask the key escrow for the key
in order to decrypt data downloaded from the cloud. The key escrow system
ensures that the key is only accessible to authorized persons but not to the
cloud operator, and is assumed to securely erase the key when data is deleted.
2.3 Policy Based Assured Deletion
The previously mentioned approach can be extended to support policy based
deletion, where each piece of data is assigned a policy and deleted when the
policy is revoked. Under such a scheme, each piece of data is still encrypted
with a uniquely generated key (known as data keys). However, instead of
storing keys for each individual piece of data in the key escrow, the key escrow
only stores a limited number of keys, each of it associated with a single policy
(known as control keys), which is then used to encrypt the data keys. The
encrypted data key is stored along with the encrypted data, and decrypted by
the key escrow during data retrieval. When a policy is revoked, the associated
control key is securely erased, causing all data keys encrypted by the control
key, and by extension the data encrypted by those data keys irretrievable. The
scheme was proposed by Ephemerizer[25] as a means to reduce the number of
keys stored by the key escrow to simplify key management.
FADE[23] further extends the previous idea by allowing any combination of
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policies to be applied on a single piece of data. For example, we may want to
keep data, even if one of many policies applied is revoked, or we may want to
delete data if any one of many policies is revoked. In the former case, we can
create multiple copies of the data key and encrypt each with different control
keys such that revocation of a single policy only removes access to only one
copy of the data key, while allowing access to other copies via different policies.
For the latter case, we can encrypt a single copy of the data key with each
of control keys, and the data key cannot be decrypted with revocation of any
policies. By applying a combination of the above two, i.e. multiple copies of
data keys each encrypted multiple times by different groups of control keys,
FADE is able to handle any combination of policies to be applied on data.
We note that existing studies for secure erasure does not consider the is-
sue of version control. In Chapter 3.2, we show that existing version control
systems and assured deletion systems are incompatible with each other.
2.4 Convergent Encryption
Version control follows the notion of deduplication [4], which eliminates the
storage of redundant data chunks that have the same content. In the security
context, recent studies propose convergent encryption [26, 27], such that the
key for encrypting/decrypting a data chunk is a function of the content of
the data chunk, so that the encryptions of two redundant data chunks will
still return the same content. However, in convergent encryption, if we want
to assuredly delete a data chunk of a particular version, we cannot simply
remove its associated key, since it may make the identical chunks in other
versions unrecoverable.
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2.5 Cloud Based Backup Systems
There are a few cloud backup systems in the market. Examples include com-
mercial systems like Dropbox [15], Jungle Disk [28], and Nasuni [6], as well as
the open-source Cumulus system [3], all of which provide version control and
archive different versions of backups. Specifically, Cumulus considers a thin
cloud interface, meaning that the cloud only provides basic functionalities for
outsourced storage, such as put, get, list, and delete1 . It splits a file into
chunks, and only modified chunks will be uploaded to the cloud. New versions
may refer to the identical chunks in older versions, so no redundant chunks
across versions will be stored. Note that Cumulus does not provide assured
deletion.
In March 2011, Nasuni announced that its system enables the new snapshot
retention policy that allows assured deletion of backup snapshots [29]. On the
other hand, there is no formal study about their implementation methodologies
and performance evaluation. We address this issue in the first part of this
thesis. We provide a comprehensive study that describes the design details of
how to integrate assured deletion into a general version-controlled system with
deduplication. We also provide extensive empirical evaluation and monetary
cost analysis for our design.
2.6 Fault Tolerant Deduplication Systems
Deduplication was first proposed in Venti [4] as a means to eliminate the stor-
age of redundant blocks in archival storage. Data Domain [30] and Foundation
[31] are proposed to improve the archival throughput of Venti via new dedu-
plication indexing techniques. Such systems are centralized. They mainly
focus on improving the deduplication performance without considering fault
1The delete operation only requests the cloud to remove the physical copy of a file, but
there is no guarantee that the file is assuredly deleted.
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tolerance.
Our work in the second part of this thesis studies deduplication in a dis-
tributed setting, which is also considered in the literature. Farsite [32] and
Pastiche [33] are distributed systems that apply file-level deduplication and
block-level deduplication, respectively. Hydrastor [34] implements decentral-
ized, fault-tolerant deduplication for archival storage. It distributes both dedu-
plication metadata and archival data in a distributed hash table. DeDe [35]
implements fault-tolerant deduplication for virtual machine images in a decen-
tralized SAN environment where no centralized metadata server is required.
Note that DeDe applies oﬄine deduplication (i.e., deduplication after writes),
while we apply inline deduplication when data is about to be uploaded to
the cloud (see Chapter 6.3 for details). Extreme Binning [36] and MAD2 [37]
propose various performance optimization techniques to achieve high dedupli-
cation throughput for distributed storage. Our work in the second part of
this thesis has a different design space from the above work, as we consider
a distributed proxy system for cloud storage. Our objective is to maintain
deduplication metadata in a fault-tolerant proxy system, while relying on the
cloud infrastructure to provide high-availability storage for data.
Proxy-based solutions for cloud storage have been proposed in commercial
solutions (e.g., Amazon’s AWS Storage Gateway [5], Nasuni [6], Panzura [7],
StorSimple [8]) and academic projects (e.g., RACS [9], DepSky [10], BlueSky
[12], and NCCloud [11]). Commercial solutions provide limited implemen-
tation details, so it is difficult to evaluate their performance in maintaining
fault tolerance. For academic projects, NCCloud [11] and BlueSky [12] use a
single-proxy design. RACS [9] considers a distributed proxy system and uses
Zookeeper-based [38] distributed locks to synchronize the states among mul-
tiple proxies. DepSky [10] uses low-contention file locks to support multiple
writes on the same file. Our work focuses on evaluating the performance-
consistency trade-off in the deduplication context.
Chapter 3
Design of FadeVersion
In this chapter, we present the design of FadeVersion, a secure cloud backup
system that works seamlessly with today’s cloud storage services such as Ama-
zon S3. It is a client-side system which integrates both version control and
assured deletion.
3.1 Threat Model and Assumptions for Fade
Version
We consider a retrospective attack threat model: an attacker wants to recover
specific files that have been deleted. This type of attack may occur if there is a
security breach in the cloud data center, or if a subpoena is issued to demand
data and encryption keys. We assume that the attacker is omnipotent, i.e., it
can obtain copies of any encrypted data, as well as keys on any machines.
Our security goal is to achieve assured deletion of files for a cloud backup
system with version control. We adopt the cryptographic approach [19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24], i.e., by removing the keys that are used to decrypt the data backups
stored on the cloud. We make two assumptions for this approach. First, the
encryption operation is secure, in the sense that it is computationally infeasible
to revert the encrypted data into the original data without the decryption key.
Second, we assume that the decryption keys are maintained by a key escrow
12
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system that is totally independent of the cloud and can be fully controlled by
cloud clients. If a file is requested to be assuredly deleted, then we require the
associated key be securely erased [17], which we believe is feasible given that
the size of a key is much smaller compared to a backup file. In chapter 3.7, we
discuss in more detail the design of the key escrow system.
3.2 Motivation
We argue that existing version-controlled cloud backup systems (e.g., Cumulus
[3]) and assured deletion systems (e.g., Vanish [21] and FADE [23]) are incom-
patible. To elaborate the issue, we consider a scenario in which we archive data
backups using two independent systems, i.e., a version control system and an
assured deletion system, and explain how they break certain functionalities.
There are two approaches of deployment. In the first approach, we first
pass data backups through the version control system, followed by the assured
deletion system, as shown in Figure 3.1(a). Suppose that Version V1 is first
generated, followed by Version V2. In this case, if there are some identical file
copies in both versions, then Version V2 can keep references to point to the
identical file copies in Version V1 instead of storing redundant file copies. In
other words, Version V2 may depend on some files in Version V1. Then we pass
the versions through the assured deletion system, which we assume is based
on cryptographic protection as described in chapter 2. Now, if we want to
assuredly delete Version V1, then we can remove the cryptographic key that
encrypts Version V1. However, since Version V2 shares some files in Version V1,
some files in Version V2 also become inaccessible. In short, assuredly deleting
one version may also affect future versions.
In the second approach, we first pass data backups through the assured
deletion system, followed by the version control system, as shown in Fig-
ure 3.1(b). First, each backup file is encrypted with different cryptographic
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keys by the assured deletion system. If two identical files are encrypted with
different keys, then their encrypted copies will have different format. Thus, if
we pass these encrypted files through the version control system, then the ver-
sion control system cannot discover any commonality between the encrypted
copies and cannot share identical files across versions.
3.3 Main Idea
Our goal is to make both version control and assured deletion compatible with
each other in a single design. The main idea of FadeVersion is as follows. We
first start with the design of a version-controlled cloud backup system that
has similar ideas as in Cumulus [3], in which we create different data objects
that are to be archived on the cloud. On top of the version control design, we
add a layered approach of cryptographic protection, in which data is encrypted
with the first layer of keys called the data keys, and the data keys are further
encrypted with another layer of keys called the control keys. The control keys
are defined by fine-grained policies that specify how each file is accessed. If a
policy is revoked, then its associated control key is deleted. If the data object
is associated solely with the revoked policy, then it will be assured deleted;
if the data object is associated with both the revoked policy and another
active policy, then we still allow the data object to be accessed through the
active policy. We elaborate how this idea is designed and implemented in the
following chapters.
3.4 Version Control
In FadeVersion, each backup version (or snapshot) arranges data files into file
objects. Each file object is of variable size with a configurable maximum-size
threshold (e.g., currently set as 1 MB). If a file has size less than the threshold,
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Figure 3.1 Illustration of why existing version control systems and assured
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then it can be represented by a single object; otherwise, we split the file into
multiple objects. Thus, if there is any modification to a large file, then we only
need to upload the modified objects, rather than the whole file, to the cloud so
as to save the upload and storage costs. To further reduce the upload cost, we
can group multiple objects into a segment, and each transfer request is done
on a per-segment basis [3].
In many cases, the same file (or object) may appear in multiple backup
versions, or different files (or objects) may have the same content in the same
or different versions. We employ deduplication [4] to further reduce storage.
Specifically, if two objects have the same content, then we only need to store
one object on the cloud and create smaller-size pointers to reference the stored
object. To determine if two objects have the same content, we apply a cryp-
tographic hash function (e.g., SHA-1) to the content of each object and check
if both objects return the same hash value.
We may further look for the identical content that can be deduplicated
within an object using a more fine-grained technique like Rabin Fingerprints
[39]. However, we note that it does not always significantly improve the stor-
age efficiency, such as using the datasets in our experiments (see Chapter 5).
Therefore in this thesis, we assume that an object is the smallest unit of data
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Figure 3.2 Illustration of how version control works.
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time t2 > t1
backups.
FadeVersion allows users to archive backup files at different time instants,
and organizes backups into different versions (snapshots). For each version,
there is a metadata object that describes the file objects. Figure 3.2 illustrates
how we upload different backup versions. Suppose that at time t1, we want
to upload a version V1 of four file objects: (O1, O2, O3, O4). Suppose later at
time t2 > t1, we do not include O1 and O2, but add new file objects O5 and
O6. Thus, the new version V2 will upload the physical copies of O5 and O6,
and its metadata object has pointers to refer to the physical copies of O3 and
O4 in version V1. Finally, all the metadata objects and file objects are stored
on the cloud.
3.5 Assured Deletion
We now incorporate assured deletion into the version control design discussed
in the previous sections. To simplify our discussion, we focus on the case where
we want to assuredly delete a particular backup version.
FadeVersion employs two-layer encryption to achieve assured deletion. Fig-
ure 3.3 illustrates the idea. Denote {.}k as the symmetric-key encryption (e.g.,
AES [40]) with key k. For each object Oi, we generate a data key ki, and en-
crypt Oi with ki via symmetric-key encryption (i.e., compute {Oi}ki). For
each version Vi, we generate a control key si, and encrypt all data keys of the
objects associated with version Vi using si via symmetric-key encryption (i.e.,
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compute {ki}si). The encrypted data keys are stored in the metadata object
of version Vi, and will be later uploaded to the cloud. The control keys are
kept by a key escrow system (see Chapter 3.7). To recover a file object of
a version, we need to get the corresponding control key of the version from
the key escrow system, and decrypt the corresponding data key and hence the
encrypted file object.
The deduplication feature is still maintained. For example, in Figure 3.3,
both the encrypted copies O3 and O4 are still shared by both versions V1 and
V2. Their respective data keys k3 and k4 are separately encrypted with s1 and
s2. To recover O3 and O4, we can use either s1 or s2 to decrypt their data
keys.
We now explain how FadeVersion enables assured deletion of a particular
version. Suppose that we request to assuredly delete a particular version V1.
Then FadeVersion will purge the control key s1 from the key escrow system.
Since s1 is purged, we cannot decrypt the encrypted data keys associated with
snapshot V1, even if there are many replicated copies on the cloud. Note that
file objects O1 and O2 only appear in the assuredly deleted version V1, but
not in other active versions. Thus, both of them will become permanently
inaccessible.
Note that the assured deletion of one version does not affect other active
versions, even if different versions have data dependency. When we purge the
control key s1, we can still retrieve version V2 that is protected by a different
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control key s2, and hence recover the file objects O3 and O4. The layered
encryption approach in essence decouples the data dependency across versions.
3.6 Assured Deletion for Multiple Policies
We can generalize the idea of assured deletion for multiple policies, each of
which specifies the access privilege of a file object. Each file object can be
simultaneously associated with multiple policies. If any one of the policies
is revoked, then the file object will be assuredly deleted. This enables us to
perform fine-grained assured deletion on data backups that are stored on the
cloud.
To formalize, we now revise our notation associating a file object with
multiple policies as follows. Let kid be the data key for file object with a
unique identifier id. Let P denote the policy that describes the access right for
a file object, and sP be the control key associated with policy P . Let {m}k
denotes the symmetric-key encryption of message m with key k. Thus, to
protect a file object O with identifier id with policies P1, P2, · · · , and Pn, we
apply layered encryption as follows:
{O}kid and {{{kid}sP1}sP2 ...}sPn.
If any control key sPi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is purged, then kid becomes inaccessible, so
does file object O.
We illustrate how fine-grained assured deletion is achieved. Suppose that
we archive the data files of Alice on a regular basis. Then we can associate each
file object for file F with three policies: (i) user-based policy (e.g., “accessible
by Alice only”), (ii) file-based policy (e.g., “accessible via file F only”), and
(iii) version-based policy (e.g., “accessible via backup version Vi only”). Then
we can support three different operations of assured deletion, respectively:
(i) assuredly deleting all files of Alice across all backup versions by revoking
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the user-based policy, (ii) assuredly deleting file F across all backup versions
by revoking the file-based policy, (iii) assuredly deleting a particular backup
version by revoking the version-based policy. We point out that we can readily
generalize the assured deletion scheme for other combinations of policies.
3.7 Key Management
The control keys are maintained by a key escrow system, which we assume can
securely remove the control keys associated with revoked policies to achieve
assured deletion (see Chapter 3.1). On the other hand, it is still important
to maintain the robustness of the existing control keys that are associated
with active policies. Here, we discuss two possible approaches to address the
robustness of key management.
One approach is by encrypting all control keys with a single master key,
while this master key is stored in secure hardware (e.g., trusted platform mod-
ule [41]). The justification is that protecting the robustness of a single key is
easier than protecting the robustness of multiple keys. However, if the hard-
ware that stores the master key is failed, then all control keys will be lost.
Another approach is by using a quorum scheme based on threshold secret
sharing [42]. Each control key is split into N key shares and are distributed
to N independent key servers, such that we need at least K < N of the key
shares to recover the original control key. The justifications of applying the
quorum scheme are two-fold. First, even if one key server is failed, we can still
obtain the key shares from the remaining N − 1 key servers. This ensures the
fault-tolerance of key management. Second, an attacker needs to compromise
at least K key managers in order to obtain the control key for decrypting the
data on the cloud. This increases the attack resources required by the attacker.
On the other hand, the challenge is that it increases the management overhead
of maintaining multiple key servers.
Chapter 4
Implementation of FadeVersion
We now present how FadeVersion is implemented to support both version
control and assured deletion. FadeVersion is an extension of Cumulus [3],
upon which we add new cryptographic implementation for assured deletion.
The cryptographic operations are implemented with OpenSSL [43].
4.1 System Entities
FadeVersion is built on several system entities, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Their functionalities are described as follows.
Backup storage. It is the target destination where data backups are stored.
The current implementation of FadeVersion uses Amazon S3 [44] as the stor-
age backend. This can be easily extended to other third-party cloud storage
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services that offer generic file access semantics such as put, get, list, and
delete.
Backup module. This is to (i) create backup versions from data files and
upload them to the cloud, and (ii) retrieve backup versions from the cloud
and recover the original data files. It acts as an interface for other entities. It
queries the object database for deduplication optimization, and communicates
with the key escrow system to obtain the keys for encryption/decryption.
Object database. It maintains the identifiers and hash values of all file
objects that are stored in the backup storage. It also stores the data key for
each file object. During the backup operation, the backup module queries
the object database to check by hash values whether an identical file object
is created in the previous backup version, so as to perform deduplication if
possible. If an identical file object is found, then the corresponding data key
will be retrieved, encrypted with the corresponding control keys, and included
in the new backup version. The backup module also records new file objects in
the database. We currently deploy the object database locally with the backup
module. We also use SHA-1 as the hashing algorithm, but this can be easily
configurable.
Key escrow system. It creates and manages control keys associated with
policies (see Chapter 3.6). It creates mappings between each policy (defined
by a unique identifier) and the corresponding control key. Currently, the key
escrow system is implemented as a single key server process, which is deployed
locally with the backup module. However, it can be extended for a higher
degree of fault tolerance (see Chapter 3.7).
Stat Cache [3]. It keeps metadata locally generated by the system from
completed backups (see Chapter 4.2) to improve backup performance. During
the backup process, it can use the stored metadata to check if a file has been
modified by comparing the last modification time of the file1on the filesystem
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and in the metadata. If the file has not been modified, then the backup
module will directly reuse the information from the stat cache to construct
the metadata of the unmodified file for the current backup version, without
needing to process the unmodified file again.
4.2 Metadata Format in FadeVersion
We use the metadata object to keep the information of all archived file objects
in a backup version (see Chapter 3.4). FadeVersion extends the metadata
format in Cumulus [3] to include the policy information and the encrypted
cryptographic keys, both of which are used for assured deletion.
Figure 4.2 shows the metadata formats for a single file in Cumulus and
FadeVersion, assuming that the file contains three file objects (i.e., A/1, A/2,
A/3). In FadeVersion, we add an additional field named key, which stores the
data key of each associated data object. The data key is encrypted with the
control keys of the corresponding policies, and the control keys are kept by
the key escrow system. In our prototype, each file object is associated with
three policies (see Chapter 3.6): (i) user-based policy, which is described by
the user field, (ii) file-based policy, which is described by the name field, and
(iii) version-based policy, which is described by the version in which the file
resides. Based on the information, FadeVersion can know how to restore a file,
i.e., by using the correct control keys from the key escrow system to decrypt
the data keys, and how to revoke a policy and its associated files.
We use AES [40] as the encryption algorithm to encrypt file objects and
their corresponding data keys. AES is a block-cipher encryption scheme with
block size 128 bits, so the size of the encrypted data key remains the same even
it is encrypted multiple times with different policies. In our implementation,
we use the 128-bit key size for both data keys and control keys, so the size
1The modification time of a file is obtained using the stat() system call.
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of the encrypted data key is fixed to be 128 bits (16 bytes). If a file object




In this chapter, we conduct an empirical study on the prototype of FadeVer-
sion. We compare FadeVersion with Cumulus [3]. Our goal is to evaluate the
performance overhead of adding assured deletion on top of a version-controlled
cloud backup system. We explore the overhead from three perspectives: (i)
backup/restore time, (ii) storage space, and (iii) monetary cost, and we show
that the overhead of adding assured deletion is reasonable or minimal in all
three perspectives.
5.1 Setup
Our experiments use Amazon S3 Singapore as our cloud storage backend. We
deploy both Cumulus and FadeVersion on a Linux machine that resides in
Hong Kong. The Linux machine is configured with Intel Quad-Core 2.4GHz
CPU, 8GB RAM, and Seagate ST3250310NS hard drive.
We drive our experiments with real-life workload. We conduct nightly
backups for the file server of our research group. The dataset that we use
consists of 46 days of snapshots of the home directory of one of the users.
Table 5.1 summarizes the statistics of the dataset, including the summaries of
the full snapshots on the first day (i.e., Day 1) and last day (i.e., Day 46).
Figure 5.1 shows the cumulative distribution functions of file sizes of the
24
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Table 5.1 Statistics of our dataset.
Day 1 Day 46
Number of files 5590 11946
Median 2054 B 1731 B
Average 172 KB 158 KB
Maximum 56.7 MB 100 MB
Total 940 MB 1.85 GB

























file size (in bytes)
Day 1
Day 46
full snapshots on Day 1 and Day 46, respectively, and Figure 5.2 shows the size
of data changes per day reported by rdiff-backup [45]. Since the size of data
changes is less significant compared to the size of the entire home directory, we
expect that the distributions of file sizes across different days of data backups
remain fairly stable throughout the entire backup period.
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We first evaluate the backup operation. On Day 1, both Cumulus and Fade-
Version start the initial backup, which uploads the full snapshot of the home
directory to the cloud; from Day 2 onwards, both systems will conduct the
incremental backups, which store the backup versions that are incrementally
built from the previous backup versions.
The backup times for performing a full snapshot on the first day for Cu-
mulus and FadeVersion are 43.18s and 44.55s, respectively (i.e., FadeVersion
uses 3.2% more time). The additional overhead of FadeVersion is mainly due
to the key management and cryptographic operations, but such overhead is
minimal compared to Cumulus.
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The backup time of storing each incremental backup on the cloud is com-
posed of two parts: (i) the time for creating a backup version based on the
previous backup versions, and (ii) the time for uploading the created backup
version to the cloud (i.e., Amazon S3 Singapore). Our measurements are av-
eraged over three times.
Figure 5.3 shows the time for creating incremental backups for Cumulus
and FadeVersion. FadeVersion introduces higher creation time. On average,
FadeVersion uses 9.8% more time than Cumulus in creating incremental back-
ups.
Figure 5.4 shows the time for uploading incremental backup versions to the
cloud. We only measure the time to upload the incremental backups but not for
the initial backup, as the latter takes much longer time than the incremental
backups that follow. We observe that both Cumulus and FadeVersion have
very similar values of upload time, and the average values are 6.624 s and
7.106 s, respectively.
We also evaluate the time for restoring a backup. The restore operation
includes: (i) downloading the necessary file objects from the cloud and (ii)
restoring the original view of the entire home directory. We note that the
former part takes the dominant portion of time, and the overhead added by
our restore module becomes insignificant. For instance, we try restoring the
snapshot for Day 46 from S3, and the time taken (averaged over 10 trials each)
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by Cumulus and FadeVersion are 26.47 minutes and 26.13 minutes respectively,
in which 25.11 minutes and 24.47 minutes are used in downloading files. Thus,
both systems have very similar restore time, and the overhead of FadeVersion
is easily masked by the downloading time. In order to minimize the effect
of network fluctuations in restore time, we try restoring from local storage.
Figure 5.5 shows the results of restoring snapshots from all 46 days in sequence
from the local storage. On average, FadeVersion uses 55.1% more time than
Cumulus in restoring backups. The overhead of FadeVersion is mainly due to
the cryptographic operations of decrypting all encrypted file objects, and this
accounts for 97.25% of the overhead on average. Note that the increase in
restore time around day 40-45 for both systems is due to the increase of the
size and number of files of the dataset on those days, both systems will have
to process and copy more data from the file objects in order to recover the
filesystem when compared to the previous snapshots.
5.3 Storage Space
FadeVersion includes encrypted copies of data keys in data backups for as-
sured deletion (see Chapter 4.2), and this introduces storage space overhead.
Here, we evaluate the space overhead of FadeVersion due to the storage of
keys. Table 5.2 summarizes the storage space of both systems. Note that the
actual storage space on the cloud is less than the full snapshot sizes as shown
in Table 5.1, mainly because both Cumulus and FadeVersion exploit dedupli-
cation to reduce the storage of redundant data (see Chapter 3.4). On average,
FadeVersion introduces 19.4% more space increment per month compared to
Cumulus.
We now focus on incremental backups. Figure 5.6 illustrates the storage
space of both Cumulus and FadeVersion in the incremental backups on different
days. We observe that FadeVersion introduces fairly similar storage space
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Table 5.2 Summary of storage space on the cloud using Cumulus and Fade-
Version.
Initial Storage Total Storage Increment
on Day 1 on Day 46 per month
Cumulus 597.03 MB 755.73 MB 105.67 MB
FadeVersion 597.51 MB 786.88 MB 126.24 MB















overhead on each day.
5.4 Monetary Cost
We estimate the monetary cost overhead of FadeVersion after adding assured
deletion. Here, we focus on the backup operation. We consider the monetary
costs due to two components: (i) the storage cost of storing 46 days of backup
for a month and (ii) the bandwidth cost of uploading 46 days of incremental
backups to the cloud since the initial backup. We consider the pricing plans
of various cloud providers in addition to Amazon S3.
Table 5.3 shows the costs of Cumulus and FadeVersion. We observe that
when compared to Cumulus, the additional storage cost of FadeVersion is
within $0.008 per month, and its additional bandwidth cost is within $0.003.
The monetary cost overhead of FadeVersion is minimal in general.
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Table 5.3 Storage costs per month and overall bandwidth cost of Cumulus
and FadeVersion for 46 days of backup with different cloud providers.
Storage Fade- Bandwidth for Fade-
Providers $/GB/month Cumulus Version updates $/GB Cumulus Version
S3 (Singapore) 0.14 $0.103 $0.108 0.10 $0.0154 $0.0185
Rackspace 0.15 $0.111 $0.115 0.08 $0.0124 $0.0148
Nirvanix SDN 0.25 $0.184 $0.192 0.10 $0.0154 $0.0185
Windows Azure 0.15 $0.111 $0.115 0.10 $0.0154 $0.0185
Google Storage 0.17 $0.125 $0.131 0.10 $0.0154 $0.0185
5.5 Conclusions
We present the design and implementation of FadeVersion, a system that pro-
vides secure and cost effective backup services on the cloud. FadeVersion is
designed for providing assured deletion for remote cloud backup applications,
while allowing version control of data backups. We use a layered encryption
approach to integrate both version control and assured deletion into one de-
sign. Through system prototyping and extensive experiments, we justify the
performance overhead of FadeVersion in terms of time performance, storage
space, and monetary cost.
We note that the main performance overhead of FadeVersion is the ad-
ditional storage of cryptographic keys in data backups. In future work, we




This chapter presents the design and implementation details of CFTDedup.
The main use of CFTDedup is to provide deduplication for archival applica-
tions in cloud storage via a fault-tolerant distributed proxy design.
6.1 Failure Model
CFTDedup is deployed as a distributed proxy system in which each client
connects to one of multiple proxies. In this work, we assume a crash (or fail-
stop) failure model, in which both a proxy and a client may stop operating
and lose all states maintained by them.
The goal of CFTDedup is to ensure crash fault tolerance (CFT) against
proxy/client crashes. In case a proxy crashes, it loses all deduplication meta-
data that identifies whether an uploaded block can be deduplicated. We re-
quire that CFTDedup enable a client to connect to a different proxy that keeps
the same deduplication metadata when the failed proxy crashes. CFTDedup
achieves this by enforcing a strong consistency model, in which the deduplica-
tion metadata is fully synchronized across all proxies. On the other hand, in
case a client crashes while uploading data, its current upload session aborts.
We require that CFTDedup roll back the upload session of the failed client
and restore the deduplication metadata to the state right before the upload
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session starts.
Here, we do not consider Byzantine faults, in which faulty nodes may be-
have arbitrarily [46]. We also assume that the cloud storage site provides
fault-tolerant storage and is always available.
6.2 System Overview
Figure 6.1 illustrates the architecture of CFTDedup. Each Client uploads/-
downloads data to/from the cloud via a proxy. Each proxy comprises several
building blocks. The Backup Module executes the deduplication algorithm, and
coordinates other modules to perform deduplication. The Dedup Store keeps
the deduplication metadata, which will be replicated across all proxies. The
Sync Module broadcasts changes of deduplication metadata to all proxies. The
Lock Module implements distributed locking that ensures that only one proxy
can modify deduplication metadata at any time. The Client Monitor monitors
whether a client is alive, and rolls back the client’s upload process if the client
fails. The Storage Layer is an abstraction layer between a proxy and the cloud
storage site.
CFTDedup is designed with modularity in mind. This enables us to easily
add new functionalities into each module and address different open issues (see
Chapter 8.1).
CFTDedup contains multiple proxies that we assume are deployed as inde-
pendent servers. Since the proxies need to maintain a synchronized view, we
assume that they are interconnected via a high-speed local area network so as
to exchange view updates with low latency.
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We now describe how a CFTDedup proxy operates on a client’s data stream
(called a snapshot) being uploaded to the cloud and synchronizes the dedupli-
cation operation among several proxies.
Deduplication design. The Backup Module divides a client’s snapshot
into blocks, and applies cryptographic hashing to the block content. Multiple
blocks with identical content all have the same hash, and only the blocks with
unique content will be uploaded to the cloud. We assume that the probability
that two distinct blocks have the same hash is negligible [4]. Our current
implementation assumes fixed-size blocks of size 4KB each, but we can also
apply deduplication on variable-size blocks (e.g., using Rabin fingerprinting
[39]). Also, our current cryptographic hashing scheme is based on SHA-256.
Our deduplication approach is inline, meaning that deduplication is applied
on the write path (i.e., when the data is about to be uploaded to the cloud).
Inline deduplication not only improves storage efficiency, but also eliminates
the transmission overhead of uploading redundant data to the cloud.
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Each proxy keeps the deduplication metadata, which is used to identify if an
uploaded block can be deduplicated with any identical blocks of the currently
and previously uploaded snapshots. It holds the meta records of all unique
blocks that have been uploaded. Each block record has the hash value, the
block address, and a reference count that specifies the number of uploaded
blocks sharing the same hash. The deduplication metadata is stored in Dedup
Store.
Locking and synchronization. Our current design enforces strong con-
sistency, such that only one proxy can handle data upload and modify the
deduplication metadata at any time. Our goal is to have all proxies share the
same view of the deduplication metadata. To achieve this, the Backup Module
must first acquire a distributed lock from the Lock Module whenever accessing
and modifying the deduplication metadata. The distributed lock can be held
by one process at any time. Also, we use an atomic broadcast model [47] to syn-
chronize a deduplication metadata update among all proxies. By atomic, we
mean that when the Sync Module broadcasts an update, all surviving proxies
must reliably receive the update.
Batching. If we update the deduplication metadata for each uploaded
block, the overheads due to locking and synchronized broadcast will signifi-
cantly increase. Thus, we apply the batching concept as follows. After the
Backup Module locks the deduplication metadata, it keeps collecting uploaded
blocks from the Client. It checks if each block can be deduplicated, and mean-
while updates its own copy of the deduplication metadata. It aggregates the
unique blocks into a segment. If the segment size exceeds a pre-defined thresh-
old or when the snapshot reaches the end, then it uploads the segment as a
data object to the cloud and broadcasts the batched update of the deduplica-
tion metadata to other proxies. Finally it releases the lock. With batching, we
perform locking and synchronization operations on a per-segment basis rather
than on a per-block basis, thereby reducing the overheads incurred.
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Putting it all together: upload/download. A client performs the up-
load/download operations as follows. In upload, a client provides a snapshot of
data to a proxy, which applies deduplication and broadcasts the deduplication
updates as described above. The proxy also constructs a snapshot metadata,
which contains the block addresses describing how the snapshot can later be
downloaded and reconstructed. The snapshot metadata generally has a much
smaller size than the actual snapshot data, and will also be stored on the cloud.
In download, the client first downloads, via one of the proxies, the snapshot
metadata, followed by the segments that contain the blocks of the snapshot.
The proxy can cache the downloaded blocks locally, so any subsequent blocks
with identical content need not be downloaded again. Here, the unit of down-
load is a segment. Since a segment may contain blocks referenced by other
snapshots, a large segment size can increase the likelihood of downloading
unnecessary data blocks.
6.4 Crash Fault Tolerance
We discuss how CFTDedup recovers from crash failures.
Proxy failure. Suppose that the proxy that currently handles the upload
operation fails before broadcasting the deduplication metadata updates. Then
the client re-connects to another surviving proxy, and resumes uploading the
segment currently handled by the failed proxy. Note that the failures of other
proxies do not affect the current upload session.
Client failure. If the client fails during upload, then all proxies decrement
all the reference counts of the blocks that have been uploaded, implying that
the upload session of the client is rolled back. The blocks that have already
been uploaded to the cloud may be reclaimed later via garbage collection.
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6.5 Implementation
We implement a preliminary prototype of CFTDedup in Java. CFTDedup re-
quires two specific services: distributed locking and atomic broadcast, which we
currently implement by Zookeeper [38] and Spread [48], respectively. We also
leverage Zookeeper, a distributed coordination service, to monitor all clients
and proxies. Any client/proxy that has no response after a pre-configured
timeout is considered to be failed.
Note that our CFTDedup prototype is still in its early development stage
and hence only provides baseline performance. Its performance could be im-
proved via careful optimizations.
Chapter 7
Evaluation of CFTDedup
We conduct testbed experiments to evaluate different operations of our CFTD-
edup prototype, and to understand the performance overhead of CFTDedup
in maintaining strong consistency among multiple proxies.
We show that by increasing the segment size, we are able to reduce the
overhead of synchronization to a reasonable percentage with a small penalty
on restore time, and the time required by clients to switch proxies to resume
backup when proxies fail is small when compared with restarting backup from
the beginning.
7.1 Setup
Dataset. We consider a dataset of 21 virtual machine (VM) images that are
used by students for their programming projects in a university undergradu-
ate course. Each VM is initially installed with Ubuntu 10.04 and allocated
with 10GB disk space. It is also configured to download and install any latest
patches from the Internet when it is online. Students develop their programs
and install applications on their assigned VMs during a 3-month semester. At
the semester end, we collect a snapshot of the 21 VM images for our experi-
ments.
Testbed. Our testbed comprises two client machines and three proxy
37
Chapter 7 Evaluation of CFTDedup 38
machines. We also configure a FTP server that mimics a cloud storage site.
Each machine is equipped with 2.66GHz CPU and 4GB RAM. All machines
are interconnected with a Gigabit Ethernet switch.
Metrics. Our experiments mainly focus on two metrics: storage space
usage and runtime performance of different operations. In runtime measure-
ments, we obtain average results over three runs.
7.2 Experiment 1 (Archival)
We evaluate the archival performance of uploading all VM images in our
dataset, in terms of storage space used and upload runtime. Here, we up-
load all VM images as a single snapshot.
Figure 7.1(a) shows the cumulative space usage for storing all VM images
using deduplication with 4KB block size. Compared to without deduplication
(in which we exclude zero-filled blocks), we reduce the storage space by around
40%. Note that the snapshot metadata in our CFTDedup implementation only
introduces 0.323% of storage space overhead to the snapshot of VM images (not
shown in the figure).
We also measure the runtime performance of uploading all VM images
under different settings: a single proxy without CFT (denoted by NFT), two
proxies with CFT (denoted by CFT-2), and three proxies with CFT (denoted
by CFT-3). All the above settings use only one client. Also, we run two clients
connecting to two different proxies with CFT (denoted by 2xCFT-2). We split
the dataset into two subsets of roughly the same size and have both clients
upload the subsets concurrently. We then measure the time it takes for both
clients to complete the upload.
Figure 7.1(b) shows the upload time versus the segment size for each of the
settings. Compared to NFT, the CFT settings have higher upload times due
to the locking and synchronization overheads. However, such overheads can
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Figure 7.1 Experiment 1 (Archival performance): (a) Cumulative space usage













































be reduced as the segment size increases. For example, comparing CFT-2 and
CFT-3 (both of which have very similar performance) to NFT, the increase in
upload time drops from 52.9% to 8.7% when the segment size increases from
1MB to 5MB. In addition, 2xCFT-2 has slightly higher upload time than CFT-
2 by 3.3-4.6%, since the proxies compete for the distributed lock during the
upload.
7.3 Experiment 2 (Restore)
We now evaluate the performance of restoring VM images on the client. We
download each VM image individually that was uploaded in Experiment 1, in
which we vary the segment size. The disk and memory cache on the proxy are
cleared after each VM image is downloaded.
Figure 7.2(a) shows the times needed to download each VM image for
different segment sizes. It also shows the time of downloading each VM image
directly from the FTP server when no deduplication is applied to the VM image
storage. Compared to without deduplication, CFTDedup incurs an overhead
of 29-50%. The reason is that blocks of a VM image can be deduplicated with
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Figure 7.2 Experiment 2 (Restore performance): (a) Download time versus

























































those of other VM images, and there are additional seeks for reconstructing a
VM image from different segments. This problem is called fragmentation [31]
and is inherent in deduplication. Also, the download time increases with the
segment size. For example, the 5MB case incurs 3.4% more download time
than the 1MB case.
To see why the download time increases with the segment size, Figure 7.2(b)
shows the amount of downloaded data during restore. As the segment size
increases, more data is downloaded. The reason is that data is downloaded
on a per-segment basis (see Chapter 6.3). A segment that we download may
contain blocks not being used by the current VM image file. A larger segment
generally contains more such unused blocks. For example, the 5MB case has
9.55% more data than the 1MB case.
7.4 Experiment 3 (Recovery)
We now measure the recovery performance of CFTDedup when a proxy or
a client fails. Here, we configure two proxies with CFT, and have a client
upload all VM images as a single snapshot via one of the proxies using 1MB
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segment size. In the middle of the upload, we disable either the proxy that
handles the upload or the client to resemble a failure. We leverage Zookeeper
to detect failures using timeouts (see Chapter 6.5). In our experiment, we set
the timeout to be 10s.
We first consider the recovery of a proxy failure. We disable the proxy that
handles the upload at a certain time after the upload begins. The client will
switch to another proxy and resume the upload session. We then measure the
recovery time from when the failure happens until the upload session resumes.
Figure 7.3(a) shows the recovery time required versus the proxy’s lifetime. The
recovery time generally takes 10-12s, and this is mainly determined by the 10s
timeout in our Zookeeper configuration.
We next consider the recovery of a client failure, in which the proxy needs to
roll back the client’s upload session. We disable the client at a certain time after
the upload begins. We then measure the recovery time from when the failure
happens until the entire client’s upload session is rolled back. Figure 7.3(b)
shows the recovery time versus the client’s lifetime. The recovery time increases
with the client’s lifetime as more data has already been uploaded and needs
to be rolled back. Nevertheless, the recovery time is fairly small. For example,
if the client fails 1500s (or 25 minutes) after the upload session starts, the
recovery time is within 4.5 minutes.
7.5 Summary
We summarize our findings in the previous sections below to better illustrate
the trade-offs of introducing fault tolerance:
• When a proxy fails during backup, the time for a client to switch proxies
is near constant (around 10-12s).
• Overhead in upload time can be as small as 8.7% by increasing segment
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Figure 7.3 Experiment 3 (Recovery performance): (a) Recovery time when a
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size to 5MB, while incurring a 3.4% time overhead during restore oper-
ations.
Therefore, we can conclude that for less than 10% of backup time overhead,
users are able to avoid restarting their backup tasks due to proxy failures, while
only incurring a small penalty for restore operations.
Chapter 8
Future work and Conclusions of
CFTDedup
8.1 Future Work
Our CFTDedup prototype provides a platform for future research. We now
highlight several open issues, and we plan to extend CFTDedup to address
them.
Consistency models. We currently consider one extreme of consistency
called strong consistency on deduplication metadata management. To further
mitigate synchronization overhead, we can use a weaker form of consistency
and allow proxies to have inconsistent deduplication metadata. It is possible
that two identical blocks that are simultaneously uploaded to different proxies
cannot be deduplicated with each other, since the updates of the deduplication
metadata are not yet reflected among the proxies. Understanding the trade-
offs between synchronization overhead and storage efficiency for different forms
of consistency models is our future work.
Upload throughput. The current CFTDedup design fully serializes the
data upload and deduplication operations, such that only one proxy can per-
form such operations at any time. However, with a weaker consistency model,
we may parallelize the operations with multiple proxies and achieve higher
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upload throughput. In addition, load balancing among multiple proxies is
possible to further improve the upload performance.
Deduplication design. We currently maintain a synchronized copy of the
deduplication metadata that centrally coordinates the deduplication process
among all proxies. To improve the deduplication performance, we may explore
a decentralized approach similar to DeDe [35], in which each proxy locally
applies deduplication and synchronizes the global deduplication updates later.
Also, for some data workloads such as archival data, we can exploit data
locality and design specific deduplication approaches [30]. Integrating more
elegant deduplication designs into CFTDedup is an ongoing work.
Other issues. Other future directions include: (i) extending CFTDedup
to support Byzantine fault tolerance, (ii) evaluating CFTDedup in larger-scale
deployment, (iii) integrating CFTDedup with multiple cloud vendors as in
[9, 10, 11], etc.
8.2 Conclusions
This thesis proposes the design and implementation of CFTDedup, a dis-
tributed proxy system which improves storage efficiency via deduplication in
cloud storage, while ensuring crash fault tolerance among proxies. We imple-
ment a preliminary prototype of CFTDedup, and show via benchmarks that
the tradeoffs of adding fault tolerance can be small. We plan to use it as a base-
line to explore different consistency models, throughput enhancement tech-
niques, and deduplication designs. Our preliminary CFTDedup prototype is
currently available at: http://ansrlab.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/software/cftdedup.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis has presented methods to ensure the data security and reliability
of cloud backup systems.
In the first part of this thesis (chapters 3 - 5), we presented FadeVersion,
a secure cloud backup system that serves as a security layer on top of to-
days cloud storage services. It achieves fine-grained assured deletion on top of
deduplication by employing two-layer encryption. Cloud clients can assuredly
delete particular backup versions or files on the cloud while making them
permanently inaccessible to anyone, while other versions that share common
data of the deleted versions or files will remain unaffected. We implemented
a proof-of-concept prototype of FadeVersion and conduct empirical evaluation
atop Amazon S3, and showed that FadeVersion only adds minimal performance
overhead over a traditional cloud backup service that does not support assured
deletion.
In the second part of this thesis (chapters 6 - 8), we presented CFTDedup,
a distributed proxy system designed for providing storage efficiency via dedu-
plication in cloud storage, while ensuring crash fault tolerance among prox-
ies. It synchronizes deduplication metadata among proxies to provide strong
consistency, and batches metadata updates to mitigate synchronization over-
head. We implemented a preliminary prototype of CFTDedup and evaluated
via testbed experiments its runtime performance in deduplication storage for
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virtual machine images.
Both systems provide a platform for further research, especially CFTDedup
with open issues described in chapter 8.1. With the increasing popularity of
cloud storage, we anticipate that the techniques described in this thesis will be
essential to ensuring security and reliability when using cloud storage systems
for backup.
Bibliography
[1] D. McCullagh, Fbi, politicos renew push for isp data retention laws,
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9926803-38.html, 2008.
[2] Watson Hall Ltd, Uk data retention requirements, https:
//www.watsonhall.com/resources/downloads/paper-uk-data-
retention-requirements.pdf, 2009.
[3] M. Vrable, S. Savage, and G. Voelker, Cumulus: Filesystem backup to
the cloud, in Proc. of USENIX FAST, 2009.
[4] S. Quinlan and S. Dorward, Venti: a new approach to archival storage,
in Proc. USENIX FAST, 2002.




[9] H. Abu-Libdeh, L. Princehouse, and H. Weatherspoon, RACS: A Case
for Cloud Storage Diversity, in Proc. of ACM SoCC, 2010.
[10] A. Bessani, M. Correia, B. Quaresma, F. Andre´, and P. Sousa, DEPSKY:
Dependable and Secure Storage in a Cloud-of-Clouds, in Proc. of ACM
EuroSys, 2011.
47
[11] Y. Hu, H. Chen, P. Lee, and Y. Tang, NCCloud: Applying Network
Coding for the Storage Repair in a Cloud-of-Clouds, in Proc. of USENIX
FAST, 2012.
[12] M. Vrable, S. Savage, and G. M. Voelker, BlueSky: A Cloud-Backed File
System for the Enterprise, in Proc. of USENIX FAST, 2012.
[13] S. Quinlan and S. Dorward, Venti: a new approach to archival storage,
in Proceedings of the FAST 2002 Conference on File and Storage Tech-
nologies, volume 4, 2002.
[14] B. Zhu, K. Li, and H. Patterson, Avoiding the disk bottleneck in the data
domain deduplication file system, in Proceedings of the 6th USENIX Con-
ference on File and Storage Technologies, page 18, USENIX Association,
2008.
[15] Dropbox, http://www.dropbox.com, 2010.
[16] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage, Hey, you, get
off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute
clouds, in Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and
communications security, pages 199–212, ACM, 2009.
[17] P. Gutmann, Secure deletion of data from magnetic and solid-state mem-
ory, in Proc. of USENIX Security Symposium, 1996.
[18] Z. N. J. Peterson, R. Burns, J. Herring, A. Stubblefield, and A. D. Rubin,
Secure Deletion for a Versioning File System, in Proc. of USENIX FAST,
2005.
[19] D. Boneh and R. Lipton, A Revocable Backup System, in Proc. of
USENIX Security Symposium, 1996.
48
[20] R. Geambasu, J. P. John, S. D. Gribble, T. Kohno, and H. M. Levy,
Keypad: An Auditing File System for Theft-Prone Devices, in Proc. of
ACM EuroSys, 2011.
[21] R. Geambasu, T. Kohno, A. Levy, and H. Levy, Vanish: Increasing data
privacy with self-destructing data, in Proc. of USENIX Security Sympo-
sium, 2009.
[22] R. Perlman, File System Design with Assured Delete, in ISOC NDSS,
2007.
[23] Y. Tang, P. Lee, J. Lui, and R. Perlman, FADE: Secure Overlay Cloud
Storage with File Assured Deletion, in Proc. of SecureComm, 2010.
[24] S. Yu, C. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou, Attribute Based Data Sharing with
Attribute Revocation, in ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and
Communications Security (ASIACCS), 2010.
[25] R. Perlman, (2005).
[26] P. Anderson and L. Zhang, Fast and Secure Laptop Backups with En-
crypted De-duplication, in Proc. of USENIX LISA, 2010.
[27] M. W. Storer, K. Greenan, D. D. E. Long, and E. L. Miller, Secure Data
Deduplication, in Proc. of StorageSS, 2008.
[28] JungleDisk, http://www.jungledisk.com/, 2010.
[29] Nasuni, Nasuni Announces New Snapshot Retention Functionality





[30] B. Zhu, K. Li, and H. Patterson, Avoiding the Disk Bottleneck in the
Data Domain Deduplication File System, in Proc. of USENIX FAST,
2008.
[31] S. Rhea, R. Cox, and A. Pesterev, Fast, Inexpensive Content-Addressed
Storage in Foundation, in Proc. of USENIX ATC, 2008.
[32] A. Adya et al., FARSITE: Federated, Available, and Reliable Storage for
an Incompletely Trusted Environment, in Proc. of USENIX OSDI, 2002.
[33] L. Cox, C. Murray, and B. Noble, Pastiche: Making backup cheap and
easy, in Proc. of USENIX OSDI, 2002.
[34] C. Dubnicki et al., Hydrastor: a Scalable Secondary Storage, in Proc. of
USENIX FAST, 2009.
[35] A. Clements, I. Ahmad, M. Vilayannur, and J. Li, Decentralized Dedu-
plication in SAN Cluster File Systems, in Proc. of USENIX ATC, 2009.
[36] D. Bhagwat, K. Eshghi, D. Long, and M. Lillibridge, Extreme Binning:
Scalable, Parallel Deduplication for Chunk-based File Backup, in Proc.
IEEE MASCOTS, pages 1–9, IEEE, 2009.
[37] J. Wei, H. Jiang, K. Zhou, and D. Feng, MAD2: A Scalable High-
Throughput Exact Deduplication Approach for Network Backup Services,
in Proc. of IEEE MSST, 2010.
[38] P. Hunt, M. Konar, F. P. Junqueira, and B. Reed, ZooKeeper: Wait-Free
Coordination for Internet-Scale Systems, in Proc. of USENIX ATC, 2010.
[39] M. O. Rabin, Fingerprinting by random polynomials, Technical Report
Tech. Report TR-CSE-03-01, Center for Research in Computing Technol-
ogy, Harvard University, 1981.
50
[40] NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard, http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf, 2001, FIPS PUB 197.
[41] Trusted Computing Group, http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/.
[42] A. Shamir, CACM 22, 612 (1979).
[43] OpenSSL, http://www.openssl.org/, 2010.
[44] Amazon S3, http://aws.amazon.com/s3/.
[45] rdiff-backup, http://www.nongnu.org/rdiff-backup/.
[46] L. Lamport, R. Shostak, and M. Pease, ACM Trans. on Programming
Languages and Systems 4, 382 (1982).
[47] X. De´fago, A. Schiper, and P. Urba´n, ACM Computing Surveys 36, 372
(2004).
[48] Y. Amir, C. Danilov, M. Miskin-Amir, J. Schultz, and J. Stanton, The
Spread Toolkit: Architecture and Performance, Technical report, TR
CNDS-2004-1, Johns Hopkins University, 2004.
51
